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How International Law Can Save The 
African Elephant 
Jacob Templer* 
The substantial decline of the African elephant population over 
the last few centuries has resulted in regionally distinct challenges 
for the different sub-Saharan regions of Africa. Across the 
continent, the most significant short-term threat to African 
elephant survival is poaching and the illegal trade it sustains. 
Furthermore, the greatest long-term threat these creatures face is 
habitat and range area loss. The Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
(“CITES”), is an international agreement between governments 
charged with management of the trade in endangered species. 
CITES has contributed to the major threats that encumber African 
elephant survival by its creation of the legal ivory market, and its 
structure that neglects the management of African elephants as a 
transboundary species. This article’s proposed solutions to ensure 
the survival of the African elephant are to: eliminate the legal 
ivory market and increase the incorporation of transboundary 
conservation practices in CITES elephant management. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 188 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMANS AND ELEPHANTS .............. 189 
III. CITES & THREATS TO ELEPHANT SURVIVAL ................................. 192 
a.  Short- Term Threat to Survival ................................................ 193 
b.  Short- Term Solution ................................................................ 196 
 
 *  Jacob E. Templer, 2021, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to the 
University of Miami Race & Social Justice Law Review for everyone’s hard work and 
dedication in spreading the word about important issues affecting our world. A most 
sincere thank you to Professor Jessica Owley for her time spent helping me edit many drafts 
before the final product was put forth. Further gratitude is due to organizations tasked with 
fighting off the plights that elephants face every day around the world. I hope this Note 
serves as a catalyst for others that address the legal challenges faced by other cherished, 
threatened species.  
188 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
c.  Long- Term Threat to Survival ................................................ 199 
d.  Long-Term Solution: Connectivity and Transboundary 
Regulation ................................................................................ 200 
IV. SYMBOLS OF THE ISSUES: PROPOSALS TO CHANGE CITES 
ELEPHANT POLICY ......................................................................... 204 
a.  Movement to Expand Appendix II ............................................ 204 
i.  Problem with Expansion of Appendix II ........................... 205 
b.  Movement to Expand Legal Ivory Trade ................................. 207 
i.  Why the Legal Ivory Trade Will Never Work ................... 208 
ii. The Last Elephant Stronghold: Southern Africa ................. 210 
c.  Proposal to Extend Appendix I Universally ............................. 212 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 213 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, I had the privilege to volunteer for the African Elephant 
Research Unit of Knysna Elephant Park in Knysna, South Africa. Each 
morning I would eagerly rise and rush to the common room to watch the 
sun rise over the Outeniqua mountains, exposing the giants I had come 
halfway around the world for. The park has rescued and relocated 
elephants in need since its inception in 1994, brought on by the decision 
of wildlife management to cull elephant herds as a means of crude 
population control.1 The Knysna forest of the Western Cape that surrounds 
the park was historically the southernmost point where one could find wild 
African elephants.2 While the forest was once home to over a thousand 
elephants, its last inhabitant, a lone female named Oupoot, serves as a 
symbol of the greater fight for survival elephants face across the continent 
today.3 Only a few thousand years ago, the African elephant’s range 
extended nearly five-thousand miles from the Cape to the Mediterranean.4 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (“CITES”), a multilateral environmental agreement 
 
1 KNYSNA ELEPHANT PARK, https://knysnaelephantpark.co.za (last visited Oct. 30, 
2020). 
2 Heather Dugmore, The Last Knysna Elephant Has A Message For People, 
BUSINESSDAY (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/life/2019-02-06-the-last-
knysna-elephant-has-a-message-for-people/ 
3 Riaan Grobler, Meet Oupoot, the only elephant left in the entire Knysna forest, 
NEWS24 (Feb. 2, 2019), https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/meet-oupoot-the-
only-elephant-left-in-the-entire-knysna-forest-20190215. 
4 African Elephants, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, 
https://wwf.panda.org/discover/knowledge_hub/endangered_species/elephants/african_el
ephants/? (last visited, Sept. 8, 2020). 
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among 183 nations, effectively controls the fate of endangered species 
today.5 CITES’ aim, to ensure that the trade in endangered species does 
not threaten their survival, should require its parties to address the 
challenges that threaten the survival of both African elephant species: the 
savannah and forest elephant.6 This article explores CITES’ ability to 
address both the short- and long- term threats to the survival of the African 
elephant. How humanity chooses to care for the fabled African elephant 
speaks bounds about our relationship with the natural world, one that we 
depend on for our survival. With nearly one million animal and plant 
species at risk of extinction, biodiversity loss around the world grows at 
unprecedented rates.7 Saving the African elephant does more than just 
preserve one of the most magnificent creatures on Earth: it allows the 
largest animal on Earth to show that international cooperation and 
innovation can produce effective conservation on a continental scale. 
Part II of this article presents the historical relationship between 
humans and elephants from ancient times to the modern crisis. Part III 
examines the short- and long-term threats that face African elephants, 
along with their prospective solutions. Part IV exposes recent CITES 
proposals as emblematic of the underlying elephant conservation issues 
they mask. Part V concludes that CITES’ approach to the short- and long-
term threats that face African elephants is antithetical to their survival, 
however it recognizes the enormous opportunity for elephants and humans 
alike to adjust course and preserve the species. 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMANS AND ELEPHANTS 
Humans and elephants share a long history beginning with our 
ancestor, homo erectus, dating back to approximately 1.8 million years 
ago.8 Excavations of stone tools in northeast Tanzania found alongside the 
bones of an ancient elephant species revealed the human reliance on 
elephants as an ancient food source.9 Human’s evolution into a smaller, 
 
5 What is CITES?, CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD 
FAUNA AND FLORA, https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2020). 
6 Summary for policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Services, INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCIENCE-POLICY PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY 
AND ECOSYSTEM SERVICES [IPBES] at 12 (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://ipbes.net/sites/default/files/2020-
02/ipbes_global_assessment_report_summary_for_policymakers_en.pdf. 
7 Raman Sukumar, Conflict, Negotiation and Coexistence: Rethinking Human-
Elephant Relations in South Asia 31-46 (Piers Locke & Jane Buckingham eds., 1st ed. 
2016). 
8 Id. at 40. 
9 Doran H. Ross, Elephant the Animal and Its Ivory in African Culture, 25 Afr. Arts 65, 
66 (1992). 
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more agile species, coincides with the extinction of some elephant species, 
which is suggestive of the impact elephants had as a food source.10 
Archaeological findings indicate that many African cultures incorporated 
elephant imagery into different forms of their oral literature.11 Elephant 
imagery in African culture varied in use from secular to spiritual. One 
example is the Kongo tribe in present day Democratic Republic of Congo, 
which adorned antelope horns with elephants carvings to summon 
ancestral spirits.12 In 3,000 BC, the first records of tamed African 
elephants came from the First Dynasty Egyptian hieroglyphics, which 
depicted separate symbols for wild and domestic elephants (the latter 
included a human rider).13 The most famous tame African elephants in 
history were those of Hannibal’s Carthaginian army that climbed through 
the Italian Alps in 218 BC.14 
The advent of European exploration and later colonization of Africa 
brought with it a terrible fate for elephants throughout the continent. In 
1800, the estimated population of African elephants roaming the continent 
was 26 million.15 The late nineteenth century witnessed a European 
demand for products made from elephant tusks (i.e. ivory) that included 
items such as pool balls, piano keys, and brush handles.16 This exploitation 
was enabled by the creation and distribution of large caliber elephant guns, 
marking the transition from historically subsistence hunting to hunting for 
ivory and trophy hunting.17 By 1913, the total population of African 
elephants was reduced to ten million. At that time, the United States 
consumed 200 tons of ivory a year.18 The ivory trade to Europe and 
America in the nineteenth century served as a prelude to the legal and 
illegal trade that occurs today.19 
As the twentieth century rolled on, elephants were cast in a new light. 
In 1930, Jean de Brunhoff wrote the first of fifty stories that detailed the 
adventures of the fictional elephant, Babar, which inspired other 
depictions of fictional elephants like Dr. Seuss’s “Horton” and Disney’s 
 
10 Sukumar, supra note 7, at 32. 
11 Ross, supra note 9, at 65. 
12 Id. at 70. 
13 Id. at 68. 




17 Martha Chaiklin, Early Modern Trade in Context: Ivory in World History, 8 HISTORY 
COMPASS 
530, 539 (2010); see also Ross, supra note 9, at 67. 
18 Larson, supra note 14. 
19 See id. 
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“Dumbo.”20 Despite the newly won fictional affinity, elephant populations 
would receive no reprieve. Widespread bush wars that followed the 
decolonization of Africa contributed to a substantial increase in elephants 
poached for ivory, with estimates of about 250 elephants killed a day in 
the 1950s.21 In the 1960s, an increased global interest in the conservation 
of endangered animals lead to the convention of eighty nations in 
Washington, D.C. that ultimately signed CITES in 1973.22 The mission of 
CITES remains “to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild 
animals and plants does not threaten their survival.”23 
By 1979 the global demand for ivory had depleted the African 
elephant population to 1.3 million.24 In 1988, the decade-long attempt to 
regulate a legal commercial trade in African elephant ivory by CITES 
proved to be unsuccessful as the population reduced to a meager 
600,000.25 The United States Congress banned the importation of African 
elephant ivory for commercial purposes in 1988 when it passed the African 
Elephant Conservation Act.26 In January 1990, CITES placed a total ban 
on the international trade in ivory with an upgrade of the protection status 
of African elephants globally to the highest level available under the 
treaty.27 
However, in 1997 and 2000, CITES downgraded the protection status 
of the elephant populations in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe, which permitted limited commercial trade in ivory and other 
elephant products.28 After the parties to CITES approved the sale of those 
government’s registered ivory stocks to China and Japan in 2008, the legal 
ivory trade reignited the parallel illegal ivory trade.29 As of 2016, the 
African elephant population is estimated to be 415,000, a ninety percent 
decrease in just over one-hundred years.30 
 
20 Bianca Sánchez, The Complicated History of the Human and Elephant Relationship, 
SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-
institution/complicated-history-human-and-elephant-relationship-180970858/ 




25 Elephant Ivory Trade-Relaed Timeline with Relevance to the United States, HUMANE 




28 Id; see also Solomon Hsiang and Nitin Sekar, Does Legalization Reduce Black Market 
Activity? Evidence from a Global Ivory Experiment and Elephant Poaching Data, 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 17, https://www.nber.org/papers/w22314. 
29 Id. 
30 The status of African elephants, WORLD WILDLIFE MAGAZINE (2018), 
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III. CITES & THREATS TO ELEPHANT SURVIVAL 
Today, CITES’ regulation of the trade in endangered species affords 
its parties the opportunity to affect policies that sustain effective elephant 
conservation. CITES’ facilitation of the legal ivory trade is made possible 
by the split-listing31 of African elephant populations in different countries. 
Meanwhile, the continued use of a system that fails to account for the 
inherent weakness in management of Africa’s elephants on a country-by-
country basis has threatened the African elephant with extinction. These 
two issues substantially contribute to the short- and long- term threats to 
elephant survival. However, the parties to CITES are simultaneously 
poised to correct their issues and accomplish a remarkable feat for 
elephants: save a species that still occupies a large expanse of its historic 
range and thereby preserve the crucial role elephants serve as a creator of 
the ecosystems they inhabit. Without concerted action against the threats 
that face the African elephant, their future will likely be relegated to small, 
fragmented population pockets. Elephants have viable options that could 
reroute their fate. 
CITES’ aim as an international agreement is, through ratification, to 
legally bind parties to adopt national legislation that comports with the 
regulations imposed on endangered species by CITES.32 One such 
example is a Declaration of Prohibited Exports by the Director of the 
Kenya Wildlife Service, under the Wildlife Conservation and 
Management Act, that bans the export of elephant ivory.33 The basic 
structure of CITES requires all import, export, and re-export of species to 
be authorized by a licensing system managed by a party’s domestic 
management authority, and requires each party to have a scientific 
authority advise them on the possible trade effects felt by the species.34 




31 Split-listing is when a species’ population is in on different Appendices depending on 
which 
Country the species is in i.e. an elephant in Zambia is in Appendix I, until it walks across 
the 
border to Zimbabwe, then it enters Appendix II. 
32 What is CITES?, supra note 5 
33 THE LAWS OF KENYA, REVISED EDITION (2012), 
http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/WildlifeConservationandManageme
ntActCap376_2_.pdf 
34 What is CITES?, supra note 5. 
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the same entity, such as Botswana’s Department of Wildlife and National 
Parks.35 
CITES uses three Appendices to designate the level of species 
protection.36 Appendix I is the highest level of protection for species 
threatened by extinction, with trade permitted only in exceptional 
circumstances.37 Appendix II includes species not threatened by 
extinction, but nonetheless afforded controls on their trade to prevent 
adverse effects on their survival.38 Appendix III protects a species in at 
least one country that seeks assistance in management of that species’ 
trade internationally.39 The original 1973 text provides criteria to 
determine which Appendices a species should belong in, along with 
Resolution Conf. 9.24 Criteria for Amendment of Appendices I and II 
(“Conf. 9.24”) that provides additional considerations to determine 
whether a species should be in Appendices I or II.40 Some factors 
considered to determine if a species qualifies for Appendix I include a 
decline in habitat area and quality, number of individuals, and area of 
distribution.41 The added criteria also emphasizes that species should not 
be split-listed under different Appendices given the added enforcement 
challenges it presents.42 
a. Short- Term Threat to Survival 
The short-term threat to the African elephants’ survival is poaching 
and illegal trade.43 With over 100,000 elephants dead as a result of 
poaching since 2007, the continental population estimate is 415,000.44 The 
rate of poaching varies between the four different regions elephants 
inhabit: African elephant’s ranges commonly extend across national 
 
35 Botswana - National Authorities, CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED 
SPECIES, https://www.cites.org/eng/parties/country-profiles/bw/national-authorities (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2020). 




40 Criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II (Resolution Conf. 9.24), CONVENTION 
ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES 2 (1994), 
https://cites.org/sites/default/files/document/E-Res-09-24-R17.pdf [hereinafter 9.24]. 
41 Id. at 4. 
 
42 Id. at 5. 
43 C.R. Thouless et al., African Elephant Status Report 2016: An update from the African 
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borders,45 which makes CITES’ structural design that manages national 
populations independently of one another ill-suited to continental survival. 
An understanding of the unique situation each of the four regions 
experiences provides context for the interrelated nature of elephant 
conservation and how policy in one region affects the others. 
West Africa’s elephant population is the smallest and comprises about 
three percent of the continental population with approximately 12,000. 
This region experienced extensive poaching in the 19th century.46 The vast 
majority of West Africa’s elephant population is concentrated in the W 
Transborder Park shared among Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger, with the 
remaining populations highly fragmented and isolated.47 Since 2007, local 
populations have been exterminated in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Togo.48 West Africa hosts the 
largest illegal ivory transport hub on the west coast, one of the two largest 
on the continent, in Nigeria.49 As West Africa’s elephant population 
diminishes further, poachers will have to concentrate their efforts in the 
regions that still contain higher populations. 
Central Africa has experienced severe poaching since 2003, with sixty 
percent of its elephant population killed between 2002 and 2011.50 
Notably, accurate population surveys are nearly impossible given the 
Congo Rainforest’s impenetrable vegetation cover, and decades of 
significant and pervasive armed conflict in the region.51 With speculation 
that there may be up to 100,000 unaccounted for elephants, there is great 
uncertainty surrounding the estimated population of 25,000.52 Central 
Africa is the home of the lesser known African elephant subspecies, the 
African forest elephant; the majority of their population is isolated to 
 
45 Keith Lindsay, The shared nature of Africa’s elephants, 215 BIOLOGICAL 
CONSERVATION 
260, 261 (2017). 
46 Elephants In The Dust The - African Elephant Crisis, UNEP, CITES, IUCN, and 
TRAFFIC, at 23 (2013), http://africanelephantdatabase.org (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) 
[hereinafter UNEP]. 
47 Thouless et al., supra note 43, at 10. 
48 Id. 
49 CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 
[CITES], Report on the Elephant Trade Information System, 14 (Working Paper, CoP18 
Doc. 69.3) (2019) https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/18/doc/E-CoP18-069-03.pdf 
[hereinafter ETIS]. 
50 CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 
[CITES], Report on Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, 9, CoP18 Doc. 69.2, 
(2019) https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/index.php [hereinafter MIKE]. 
51 Stephen Blake, et al., Forest Elephant Crisis in the Congo Basin, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 
945, 951 
(2007); see also Thouless et al., supra note 43. 
52 Thouless et al., supra note 43. 
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Gabon and Congo.53 The legal ivory trade of the four Southern African 
nation’s populations has an incalculable toll on Central Africa’s uncertain 
population. 
East Africa has experienced the most poaching of all regions in recent 
years, with nearly 87,000 elephants or 50% of their population lost since 
2007.54 Improved enforcement and management has stymied a local 
eradication of the 86,000 elephants left, which comprise nearly twenty 
percent of the continental population.55 
The legal trade permitted by the split-listing of elephants in Southern 
Africa into lower protection status than their counterparts undermines the 
security of populations in West, Central, and East Africa, as those 
population’s poached ivory is invariably smuggled into the legal ivory 
market.56 Southern Africa holds over seventy percent of the continental 
population at 294,000, seventy-five percent of them found in the Kavango-
Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area: a 200,000 square mile cross-
border conservation area shared among Angola, Botswana, Namibia, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.57 Southern Africa contains the largest illegal 
ivory transport hub on the east coast in Mozambique, a country rife with 
corruption that enables poaching and illegal trade to flourish.58  In recent 
years, Southern Africa has seen the emergence of a growing poaching 
threat.59 
 
53 Blake et al., supra note 51, at 951. 
54 Thouless et al., supra note 43, at 8. 
55 Id. 
56 See Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 3. 
57 Id. at 9. 
58 ETIS, supra note 49, at 14, 18. 
 
59 Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 3. 
196 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
 
The purple boundaries distinguish the regions of Africa: North, West, 
Central, East, Southern. 
b. Short- Term Solution 
Through CITES, the international community could curtail poaching 
and reduce the illegal trade by promulgating an amendment that extends 
Appendix I status to all African elephants. Under CITES’ criteria, 
Appendix I is to include “species threatened with extinction that are or 
may be affected by trade,” while Appendix II is intended to include 
“[species] not necessarily threatened with extinction.”60 The crucial 
difference is Appendix II status permits commercial trade, while Appendix 
I status prohibits it. While the threats that face African elephants are agreed 
upon throughout the scientific community, the central disagreement 
among CITES parties revolves around whether the legal trade in ivory has 
negatively impacted poaching and the illegal trade. The legal ivory trade 
 
60 CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA, 
Convention text, 1 (Mar. 3, 1973), https://www.cites.org/eng/disc/text.php. 
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today is derived from the ivory sold in past government stockpile 
selloffs.61 
While all African elephants were in Appendix II between 1977 and 
1989, the total population decreased from about 1.3 million to 600,000. In 
1989, CITES moved all African elephant populations to Appendix I, 
where they remained until the populations of Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe moved back to Appendix II in 1997 and 2000. 
Those four countries claimed the elephant populations in their countries 
were large enough that their survival would not be threatened by the legal 
trade.62 The result was the creation of the modern-day legal ivory market.63 
Appendix II status allows trade in hunting trophies, live animals, other 
elephant derived products, but most significantly – trade in government 
registered raw ivory stocks.64 
The first legal sale of raw ivory stocks occurred in 1999 when a total 
of 49,574 kilograms of ivory were sold from Botswana, Namibia, and 
Zimbabwe to Japan.65 However, with no poaching data being collected at 
the time, a connection between the sale’s effect on poaching and the illegal 
market is indeterminable.66 A second sale occurred in 2008 with the 
addition of South Africa as a supplier and China as a buyer .67 This time, 
CITES’ new programs started in 2002, Monitoring the Illegal Killing of 
Elephants, (“MIKE”), and the Elephant Trade Information System, 
(“ETIS”), enabled a connection to be drawn between the legal sale and its 
effect on poaching and the illegal trade.68 
MIKE was created to provide information to parties that enables 
informed management and enforcement decisions.69 MIKE’s objectives 
are to: record levels and trends of poaching in elephant range states, assess 
CITES’ decisions effects on elephant poaching and the illegal trade, 
provide an information pool to execute appropriate management and 
enforcement decisions, and build an institutional capacity that enables 
range states to manage their elephant populations long term.70 MIKE 




63 Id. at 4. 
64 Id. 
65 Buyers of Elephant Ivory, POACHING FACTS: TRUTHS FROM THE FRONTLINES, 
http://www.poachingfacts.com/faces-of-the-poachers/buyers-of-elephant-ivory/ 
66 Id. 
67 See generally id. China was then the largest global importer of illegal ivory; today, it 
is Vietnam. 
68 See id. 
69 CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 
(CITES), https://www.cites.org/eng/prog/mike/index.php, last visited (Jan. 1, 2020). 
70 Id. 
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Killed Elephants, (“PIKE”), with scores above 0.50 indicative of elephant 
populations in net decline.71 The ETIS program tracks and records the 
illegal trade in ivory and other elephant products, and provides analyses of 
levels and trends in the illegal trade.72 ETIS records contain elephant 
specimen seizures that have occurred globally since 1989.73 
A notable discontinuous increase in the poaching and illegal trade of 
African elephant ivory followed the 2008 sale.74 In 2019, the Hsiang study 
analyzed the 2008 legal sale’s net effect on the illegal market.75 The study 
revealed that the legal market served as a conduit for smuggler’s to infuse 
illegal ivory into the legal market, increased the cost of law enforcement, 
and lowered the cost of the illegal ivory as the risk of arrest decreased.76 
Despite the introduction of the legal market, the illegal market demand 
increased as new consumers were attracted by the reduced stigma of being 
caught or involved in an illegal trade, further complicated by the fact that 
consumers are generally unable to tell the difference between legal and 
illegal ivory.77 In Hong Kong, one of the world’s largest ivory markets, it 
is well known that ivory acquired before the 1989 ban, which is 
permissible to sell, is regularly replenished with ivory derived from 
poaching and the illegal trade.78 
Data analysis in the Hsiang study included MIKE and ETIS data from 
between 1996 and 2013.79 The data revealed a thirty-eight percent increase 
in the proportion of illegally killed elephants, a sixty-six percent increase 
in poaching rates, and a seventy-one percent increase in illegal smuggling 
out of Africa, all of which coincided with the 2008 legal sale.80 The study 
supported the theory that the 2008 legal ivory sale caused an “abrupt, 
significant, permanent, robust, and geographically widespread increase” 
in poaching and illegal smuggling.81 Further support for this conclusion 
can be found in the continued existence of the Hong Kong ivory market.82 
 
71 Id. 
72 CONVENTION ON INTL. TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA, 
The Elephant Trade Information System, https://cites.org/eng/prog/etis/index.php, (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
73 Id. 
74 See Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 21-22. 
75 See id. at 11. 
76 See id. at 7. 
77 Id. 
78 See Peter Knights et al., The Illusion of Control: Hong Kong’s ‘Legal’ Ivory Trade, 
WILDAID, 4 (2015). 
79 Hsiang & Sekar, supra note 28, at 10. 
80 Id. at 15, 27. 
81 Id. at 30. 
82 See Knights et al., supra note 78, at 9. 
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Before the ivory trade was banned in 1989, the British government 
exercised a reservation in CITES that allowed what was then the colony 
of Hong Kong to continue to sell the ivory already in its possession.83 The 
initial 670 tons of ivory in Hong Kong then became 474 tons, with wide 
suspicions that nearly 200 tons were smuggled into Japan; of the initial 
670 tons, 570 tons were found to have originated from illegally sourced 
poaching.84 
Importantly, alternative theories for the increase in poaching and 
illegal trade were ruled out: the 2008 financial crisis, an abrupt increase in 
purchase of valuable raw materials, an abrupt increase of poaching in other 
slow-breeding species (rhinoceros, tiger, leopard), a notable increase in 
Chinese GDP, or the financial investment and physical presence in African 
elephant range states.85 None of these alternative theories saw an increase 
consistent with the 2008 sale that would explain them as the cause of, or a 
significant factor towards, the increase in poaching and illegal 
smuggling.86 While CITES dedicates an entire section of MIKE reports 
towards assessment of CITES’ decisions effects on poaching, their 
position is that no evidence exists that suggests the 2008 sale affected 
poaching and illegal smuggling in any way.87 Furthermore, pre-1989 ivory 
should have been sold-off entirely by 2004 if Hong Kong’s sales records 
are to be taken as accurate.88 Those records, along with statements made 
by ivory vendors in Hong Kong attesting to the ease in which illegal ivory 
replaces pre-1989 stocks, are direct evidence of the legal ivory market’s 
impact on poaching and the illegal trade.89 
Inclusion of all African elephant populations in Appendix I will ban 
the legal trade in elephant ivory. The data supports the conclusion that a 
ban on the legal trade in ivory would drastically reduce poaching and 
illegal trade, the most significant short- term threat to the survival of the 
African elephant. 
c. Long- Term Threat to Survival 
The long-term threat to African elephant survival is habitat and range 
area loss.90 African elephant range includes diverse ecosystems of desert, 
forest, jungle, savannah, and swamp.91 Between 1995 and 2007, elephant 
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range area in Africa decreased by about forty-two percent.92 With more 
than half of global population growth projected to occur in Africa by 2050, 
encroachment is not poised to slow down.93 One of the largest foreign 
investors in Africa is China, with sixty billion dollars pledged in 2018.94 
Chinese exploitation of natural resources, coupled with their enormous 
role in the illegal ivory trade, leaves them in a powerful position regarding 
the future of elephant conservation in Africa.95 One of Africa’s largest 
investors is also one of its most prolific natural resource exploiters. 
In 2013, uncertainty surrounded whether the elephant populations of 
Senegal, Somalia, and Sudan would survive; however, in 2016 it was 
confirmed all three countries no longer possess resident elephant herds.96 
Without a concerted effort to preserve the African elephant habitat, their 
fate may resemble that of the Sumatran elephant. The lowland forests of 
Southeast Asia experienced a seventy percent deforestation rate within 
twenty-five years.97 With a major part of their habitat lost, the critically 
endangered Sumatran elephant’s population is now less than 2,800.98 The 
Sumatran elephant serves as an example of the potential future of the 
African elephant species if their habitat is not secured for generations to 
come. 
d. Long-Term Solution: Connectivity and Transboundary 
Regulation 
In 1990, Michael Glennon proposed that the CITES parties should 
treat their duty to protect their endangered species as erga omnes,99 and 
make the species’ protection a priority over individual parties’ usage of 
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of endangered species as erga omnes would enable legal causes of action 
to be brought against parties for failure to protect their endangered species 
as parties of CITES.101 Despite his proposal, CITES parties began to assert 
the United Nations Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, “to prevent the exploitation of resources in developing 
countries by neocolonial interests,” as a means for them to profit off their 
natural resources – including elephants.102 
The problem with CITES parties’ application of this principle is that 
it fosters inconsistent elephant protection policy in different countries that 
neighbor each other. The majority of African elephants’ range area extends 
across national borders;103 a treaty framework that distinguishes protection 
afforded to a species based on which country the species is in at any given 
time is antithetical to the nature of elephants as a species. Continued 
practice within CITES that permits parties to assert a sovereign right of 
determinism over their elephants places the continent’s interdependent 
population at increased risk. If CITES parties would forego their ability to 
exercise reservations in treaty proceedings regarding their national 
elephant populations, and embrace fundamental principles of 
transboundary conservation, it would reward parties with sustainable, 
long- term economic and environmental security. 
With seventy-six percent of the African elephant population found 
spread across national borders, CITES incorporation of transboundary 
conservation is better suited to their survival.104 Transboundary 
conservation achieves conservation goals across one or more national 
boundaries.105 As a part of its Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines 
series, the International Union for Conservation of Nature provides a 
comprehensive and integrated guide for transboundary conservation.106 
The guide is essentially a “how to” model for transboundary conservation 
that includes: history, key concepts, viability, operation principles, 
implementation, and capacity building.107 The potential benefits of 
transboundary conservation span legal and policy frameworks, ecosystem 
management, climate change responses, and socio-economics.108 CITES 
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parties that invest in transboundary conservation plans are poised to 
benefit from enhanced connectivity of conservation areas, protection of 
migratory species, improved genetic diversity, increased opportunities for 
cross-border eco-tourism and related enterprises, and management 
collaboration that improves patrols and decreases operation costs.109 
Habitat and range area loss are mitigated by the transboundary model 
through maintenance and increase of connectivity between populations.110 
Enhanced connectivity enables diffusive density-dependent dispersal that 
reduces human-elephant conflict, increases engagement of elephants in 
their roles as keystone species, and produces more reliable meta-
population data.111 Poaching in neighboring countries can prevent 
elephants migratory patterns, and thus produce unnatural population 
densities that increase the chances of human-elephant conflict (i.e. fighting 
over water sources).112 Examples of elephant populations crossing borders 
to replenish extinct local populations include movements from Uganda to 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and from South Africa to 
Mozambique.113 Connectivity across national borders allows for more 
natural elephant population densities, as elephants in overcrowded habitats 
seek out less crowded habitats to live in.114 
Connectivity is more important today than ever as seasonal food and 
water variability increases with climate change.115 Increased connectivity 
of elephant habitat promotes elephants engagement in their roles as seed 
dispersers, that improves the quality of their habitat.116 Improvement in 
elephant habitat and more balanced population densities would reduce 
money spent by management authorities on water provision, 
contraception, and population control.117 For example, increased 
connectivity in drought ridden regions would permit elephants to migrate 
towards alternative water sources rather than compete for water with local 
human populations, and thereby require further resources to prevent the 
resulting human-elephant conflict. Those resources would therefore be 
available to meet other conservation needs, that may include increased 
capacity for cross-border eco-tourism investment. 
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If CITES replaces the parties’ ability to exercise reservations over 
their national elephant management with an integrated cross-border 
structure that manages elephants harmoniously across national borders, 
issues such as habitat and biodiversity preservation, habitat connectivity, 
and human-elephant conflict would be remedied and replaced with 
increased sustainable long-term economic opportunities for local 
communities. 
Part of effective reform involves the national legislation in both range 
states and those affected by the illegal ivory trade.118 A comprehensive 
assessment of principal conservation legislation in numerous range states 
in Africa revealed significant loopholes and variations on provincial 
implementation of national laws, inadequate penalties, antiquated or 
CITES’ contrary legislation, presence of limited prosecutorial power and 
experience, and inadequate judicial procedure and capacity.119 
Recommendations included increased updates and homogeneity of 
domestic legislation, publication of prosecutorial statistics and judicial 
opinions, education of local communities about the realities of poaching 
and the illegal international trade, and the benefits that come with 
expansion of eco-tourism.120 
Sponsorship of initiatives that promote homogenous legislation across 
national borders for violations of CITES’ elephant protections and 
poaching are inherent in the transboundary conservation model. The Space 
for Giants organization’s judicial reform initiative that provides 
prosecutorial training to countries grappling with poaching is one example 
of a critical resource that facilitates long- term improvement of domestic 
prosecution and criminal justice.121 
Protection of African elephant habitat extends to the African 
continent’s many ecosystems. Elephants are a keystone species: those that 
maintain significant linkages in the natural food web to the extent that their 
extermination would cause a domino effect.122 In savannah ecosystems, 
negligible elephant populations are marked by low plant variation, while 
moderate elephant population density foster up to three times as much 
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variety.123 Much of the African savannah was created as elephants cleared 
dense bush and woodlands, allowing other species such as buffalo, gazelle, 
and zebra to flourish.124 The cleared bush also helps cattle ranchers as it 
provides access to otherwise inaccessible grazing land, and reduces tsetse 
fly exposure.125 Forest elephants play an enormous role in formation of 
ecosystems in Central and West Africa; they clear forest paths that open 
up the canopy and allow light to reach the rainforest floor.126 These light 
patches common to the Congo Rainforest sustain increased plant diversity, 
and also create increased access pathways for other forest species such as 
forest hog, antelope, and gorilla.127 Forest elephants are the most important 
seed dispersers in the Congo Rainforest, they contribute to the movement 
of at least ninety-six plant species in some locations.128 Local extinctions 
have already suffered the ecological consequences that come with the loss 
of a keystone species.129 Enactment of policies that protect elephant 
habitat, and thereby elephants, also protect the vast and varied natural 
ecosystems across the continent. 
CITES’ substantial incorporation of transboundary conservation into 
their institutional frameworks will promote increased quantity and quality 
of the African elephant habitat, as the species is permitted to keep their 
crucial role in the greater African ecosystem. As a species that mainly lives 
across national borders, a management model that is reflective of their 
nature is best suited to their sustained survival. 
IV. SYMBOLS OF THE ISSUES: PROPOSALS TO CHANGE CITES 
ELEPHANT POLICY 
a. Movement to Expand Appendix II 
In 2019, Zambia submitted a proposal to reclassify elephants within 
their borders under Appendix I at the Conference of the parties to 
CITES.130  Zambia is located in Southern Africa, the region of Africa that 
both contains the most elephants and has the only four parties (Botswana, 
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Appendix II. Zambia amended their initial proposal by removal of their 
sought after Appendix II permissible commercial ivory trade when they 
were met with staunch opposition by other parties.131 Opposition to 
Zambia’s initial proposal was made by Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, the 
European Union, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and the 
United States; these parties affirmed that a commercial sale of government 
stockpile ivory may reignite the illegal trade.132 Zambia’s final proposal 
was left with only the prospect of increased trade of some elephant hunting 
trophies and other derived goods.133 
In their proposal, Zambia noted that international trade is not a concern 
for the population of elephants in Zambia, and that the need to move the 
population to Appendix II arises from human-elephant conflict.134 Zambia 
further noted its intention to benefit rural communities financially from 
their ivory and trophy hunting proceeds.135 The CITES Secretariat agreed 
with Zambia that their elephant populations no longer met Appendix I 
criteria as set forth in Conf. 9.24.136 The parties voted to reject Zambia’s 
proposal, causing elephants within their borders to remain classified 
within Appendix I.137 
i. Problem with Expansion of Appendix II 
The human-elephant conflict and benefits to affected local 
communities would have been made worse had Zambia’s initial proposal 
been approved. Zambia’s proposal would have exacerbated human-
elephant conflict by increasing poaching and the illegal trade. Increase of 
the illegal trade would deprive local communities of elephants that could 
contribute to their economic well-being through eco-tourism initiatives 
possible in the transboundary conservation model.138 
One such example of local communities directly benefiting from 
management of their local elephants is the Reteti Elephant Sanctuary 
operated by the Samburu tribe in Kenya, the first community owned 
elephant orphanage in Africa.139 Human-elephant conflict is reduced with 









138 See Vasilijevic et al., supra note 105. 
139 RETETI ELEPHANT SANCTUARY, https://www.retetielephants.org/who-we-are/ (last 
visited Oct. 
25, 2020). 
206 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
have greater connectivity in their range area that produces less encounters 
with humans.140 Human-elephant conflict reduction and increased benefits 
for local communities will be forever fleeting without commitment from 
CITES parties to transboundary conservation management of elephants. 
CITES’ split-listing of elephant populations highlights the parties’ 
reluctance to embrace the transboundary conservation model. The criteria 
for amendment of a species’ Appendices status recommends that split-
listing should be avoided for the enforcement problems it creates.141 
Zambia’s elephant population is a part of the greater Kavango-Zambezi 
Transfrontier Conservation Area that spans five countries and holds 
seventy-five percent of Southern Africa’s elephant population.142 Despite 
Zambia’s claims and the CITES Secretariat’s conclusion, their elephant 
population meets the criteria for Appendix I. The third criteria of Conf. 
9.24 is a marked decline in the wild population.143 Decline is defined as a 
reduction in the number of individuals, habitat area, or area of distribution, 
and can be expressed as long term or recent.144 Recent decline is 
characterized by a fifty percent decline in the last seventy-five years.145 
Zambia’s elephant population was approximately 200,000 in 1972 and 
today stands at approximately 22,000 – a near ninety percent decline in 
less than seventy-five years.146 As such, Zambia’s elephant population 
undoubtedly satisfies the third criteria of Conf. 9.24 for Appendix I. 
Further, Zambia’s claims that the illegal international trade in ivory is 
not of concern for their elephant population is disingenuous. The 2016 
African Elephant Status Report, (“AESR 2016”), reported the Zambian 
elephant population had been severely affected by poaching.147 
Zambia is one example of many elephant range states that experience 
poor governance and corruption that prevent effective elephant 
conservation and contribute to poaching and the illegal trade. Zambia 
ranks in the bottom half of the 2018 Corruption Index and had three tons 
of ivory disappear from a government storage facility perpetrated by 
government game scouts in 2017.148 Zambia’s inability to maintain 
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effective governance necessary for a legal trade has been further 
undermined by its neighbors, with some of the worst records of elephant 
poaching and involvement in the illegal trade. To the west, Angola ranks 
165 out of 180 countries in the 2018 Corruption Index; and harbors a 
significant presence of Vietnamese crime syndicates.149 To the east, 
Mozambique ranks 158 out of 180 countries in the 2018 Corruption Index, 
illustrated by a number of large thefts from government ivory 
stockpiles.150 Mozambique is the largest illegal ivory trade base on the east 
coast of Africa, with only Nigeria as a comparable operation in the west.151 
And while Zambia should not be judged by the actions of their neighbors, 
the reality that elephants do not know when they have crossed between 
Angolan, Mozambican, and Zambian borders, highlights the needs for 
transboundary conservation. 
Zambia’s proposal sought to address issues that are in fact symptoms 
of the underlying lack of commitment to solutions for the short- and long-
term issues that face African elephants. Employment of the transboundary 
conservation model across all CITES parties, along with universal 
Appendix I status for African elephants, would help Zambia realize its 
goals and positively impact affected parties. 
b. Movement to Expand Legal Ivory Trade 
Botswana submitted a proposal at the Conference of the Parties of 
CITES in 2019 on behalf of themselves, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Zimbabwe, that would have allowed increased quotas for a proposed 
future government stockpile sale.152 The original limits permitted the 
parties to sell 20,000 kilograms for Botswana, 10,000 kilograms for 
Namibia, and 30,000 kilograms for South Africa.153 Botswana’s proposal 
would have permitted a future sale of 100,000 kilograms for Botswana, 
30,000 kilograms for Namibia, 57,717 kilograms for South Africa, and 
120,889 kilograms for Zimbabwe.154 Botswana’s proposal further reduced 
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the time between proposals of single government registered ivory sales 
from nine to six years from the last proposal.155 
Botswana cited the burden of increased elephant populations on local 
communities, fragile ecosystems, and the burden of government 
compensation for communities affected by human-elephant conflict, as the 
reasons for the proposal.156 Among the parties in opposition were Gabon, 
which noted even a controlled ivory trade has negative impacts on elephant 
populations, and Kenya, which noted the previous singe sale of 
government registered ivory resulted in an increase in ivory poaching and 
laundering.157 The parties voted to reject Botswana’s proposal.158 
Botswana’s proposal symbolized the issues of the legal trade in ivory 
along every sequence of the chain; from the nature of ivory itself, to the 
countries that seek to trade it being inherently ill-equipped, along with the 
historical roots of poor governance and corruption today. Paradoxically, 
the proponents represent the countries with the most to lose if a legal sale 
were to occur. 
i. Why the Legal Ivory Trade Will Never Work 
The nature of ivory itself doomed any chance of a viable legal trade 
from the beginning, in part because ivory itself is a luxury item mainly 
sought after in countries where rapid swaths of the population are gaining 
disposable income at increased rates that enables more people to buy more 
ivory as those economies grow.159 Ivory’s demand far exceeds elephant’s 
ability to supply it, with elephants being one of the slowest reproducing of 
all mammal species, there is a large incentive for poachers.160 
The path that ivory takes to its buyers is full of the number one factor 
associated with high poaching rates: poor governance and corruption, 
which enables centers of the illegal ivory trade to grow through increased 
operation of organized crime.161 Vietnam is the largest destination country 
for illegal ivory; Vietnamese criminal syndicates are known to operate in 
Angola, Congo, Mozambique, South Africa, and Togo.162 Countries with 
 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 3. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Elizabeth L. Bennett, Legal ivory trade in a corrupt world and its impact on African 
elephant 
populations, 29 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 54, 58 (2014). 
160 Id. at 55. 
161 Robert W. Burn, Global Trends and Factors Associated with the Illegal Killing of 
Elephants: 
A Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis of Carcass Encounter Data, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 9 (2011). 
162 ETIS, supra note 149, at 17. 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW 209 
 
large elephant populations such as Zimbabwe host corruption rankings of 
160 out of 180 countries.163 The Central African countries are starkly 
emblematic of the correlation, with the Central African Republic ranked 
149, Congo: 165, Gabon: 124, and the Democratic Republic of Congo: 
161.164 Higher vegetation cover reduces chances of detection by law 
enforcement and enables increased poaching opportunities that may 
explain why forest elephants are poached at rates significantly higher than 
savannah elephants.165 Examples of corruption include wildlife officials 
accepting bribes to alter CITES documentation, ignored poaching, and 
falsification of certificates.166 Vietnam reports that up to forty-five percent 
of wildlife outlets contain a corruption presence.167 Many stocks of ivory 
are also owned privately, with owners that speculate a crash in elephant 
populations would enable them great profits from sales of their ivory 
caches at a premium.168 The path ivory takes from source to destination is 
perfectly situated to accommodate the illegal activities required for its sale. 
Why is corruption so pervasive across many of the countries involved 
in poaching and the illegal ivory trade? The corruption and ineffective 
governance present today is in large part due to the historical exploitation 
of Africa by colonial powers. The scramble for Africa that began in the 
nineteenth century witnessed European exploitation of the continent’s 
resources at the expense of the native population.169 Subjugation of Africa 
continued until after World War II, when colonial rulers decided that the 
end of their empires had come.170 Decolonization was commonly a violent 
and haphazard process; nearly all the countries had their boundaries drawn 
for the convenience of their rulers that ignored tribal mixtures bound to 
fail.171 In 1948, the British government projected full decolonization 
would not take place until 1975, but violence erupted in Cote d’Ivoire that 
prompted the imperial governments to expedite independence for 
countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Uganda.172 
The different European colonial governments’ displacement of social and 
economic orders made the chances of national unity around their systems 
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lack appeal, their governments had been in place for less than many of 
their subject’s lifetimes.173 
This history of the corruption that facilitates the illegal ivory trades is 
a part of the foundation of the greater poor governance that exists today in 
Africa. If the parties that possess elephants can recognize the futility of the 
ivory trade in the long- term as a means of economic stimulus, they can 
embrace a more sustainable economic and cultural benefit: the value of the 
species alive. Western countries’ investment in the preservation of African 
wildlife contrasts their own lack of comparable diversity in wildlife, in 
large part due to their own historical role in their wildlife’s decimation. 
ii. The Last Elephant Stronghold: Southern Africa 
Southern Africa is the last major stronghold of African elephants. The 
elephant conservation choices the regions’ respective governments make 
have the largest impact on the future of the continental population. With 
elephant populations in West and Central Africa decimated by poaching, 
and East Africa recently benefited from improved enforcement, Southern 
Africa’s seventy percent of the continental elephant population is at dire 
risk.174 MIKE data shows Southern Africa’s PIKE score increased 2016 to 
2017.175 Of the nearly 294,000 elephants in Southern Africa, about 75% 
are found in the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area 
shared between Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.176 
Southern Africa also contains nearly forty-two percent of the range area 
of the species, spanning over 1.3 million square kilometers.177 Despite 
recorded increases in the available elephant range in Southern Africa since 
2007, the population has declined by 30,000.178 The data suggests the 
emergence of a growing poaching threat in Southern Africa includes the 
populations of Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.179 
Botswana’s proposal to expand the legal ivory trade for themselves, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, would be the beginning of the end 
for the last elephant stronghold on the continent. A larger more frequent 
legal trade would undoubtedly expand poaching and the illegal trade in the 
region. 
Botswana contains the most elephants of any country in the world with 
about 132,000 or nearly twenty-five percent of the global African elephant 
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population.180 Historically safe from the threat of poaching, Botswana has 
begun to emerge as a source of illegal ivory.181 A 593% increase in fresh 
elephant carcasses between 2014 and 2018 suggested that ivory poached 
from hundreds of elephants had recently occurred in northern Botswana.182 
Namibia has 23,000 elephants and is a source country for illegally 
processed ivory with seventy-five kilograms seized between 2015 and 
2017.183 South Africa contains nearly 19,000 elephants, and has emerged 
as a major consolidation point for export of illegal ivory smuggled from 
individuals poached in nearby Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and 
Zimbabwe.184 South Africa is a significant source of both raw ivory – one 
2017 seizure totaled 2,478 kilograms – and illegally processed ivory, with 
364 kilograms seized in 2017.185 A significant presence of criminal 
activity that includes a substantial presence of Vietnamese organized 
crime plays a large role in the operation of the illegal market in South 
Africa.186 Zimbabwe contains nearly 83,000 elephants, and was ranked 
amongst the top three countries most affected by poaching in Southern 
Africa in the AESR 2016.187 Zimbabwe emerged as a country affected by 
the illegal ivory trade for the first time in the 2018 ETIS report, and was 
cited as a source of raw ivory with 3,552 kilograms seized in 2017.188 
Zimbabwe is also one of the two most important countries of origin or 
export of illegally processed ivory; combined with Angola, they occupy 
thirty-eight percent of the global market.189 
Increased legal sales of government ivory stockpiles poses an 
enormous threat to the elephants of Southern Arica as the largest regional 
population on the continent. The double-edged sword of the situation is 
that while the proponents of Botswana’s proposal seek to gain financially 
in the short- term, they would do so at the expense of their long- term 
potential. Placement of all African elephants on Appendix I would ban the 
legal trade and affect a significant decrease in poaching and the illegal 
trade. 
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c. Proposal to Extend Appendix I Universally 
In a change of theme, Gabon submitted a proposal on behalf of 
themselves, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Syria, and Togo, that would transfer the elephant populations of 
Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe to Appendix I. In 
Gabon’s proposal, the proponents cite three criteria from Conf. 9.24 in 
support: 1) a marked decline in the wild population, either as ongoing and 
expected to continue, or projected based on levels of exploitation, 2) split-
listing of species should generally be avoided because of the enforcement 
problems created, 3) and “in case[s] of uncertainty . . .  act in the best 
interest of the conservation of the species.”190 Gabon cited a sixty-eight 
percent decline in the total African elephant population recorded over a 
three-generation period (seventy-five years) as satisfying the criteria for 
Appendix I.191 
Proponents of Gabon’s proposal highlighted: the widespread illegal 
killing of elephants and ivory smuggling throughout the continent, the high 
likelihood that estimates are below actual figures, the collapse in global 
ivory markets that followed the 1989 decision to move all African elephant 
populations to Appendix I, and the positive correlation between the 2008 
sale of government registered ivory and the subsequent dramatic increase 
in poaching and illegal ivory trade.192 
Botswana’s response to Gabon’s proposal was a perfect example of 
the deficiency in CITES’ structure. Botswana threatened their Article 
XXIII right of the Convention that would have allowed them to exercise a 
reservation that removed their elephant population from CITES 
regulation.193 In spite of the proponents of Gabon’s proposal citing that the 
continent’s population of elephants should be in Appendix I, based on 
language in the CITES agreement, Botswana essentially vetoed the 
strongest amendment to the parties’ elephant policy in favor of their own 
self-interest. In an effort to assuage Botswana, thereby retaining the 
country with the most elephants in the world in CITES’ elephant trade 
management, the parties rejected Gabon’s proposal.194 Examples such as 
Gabon’s proposal highlight the management challenges of a 
transboundary species within a system that permits one party to undermine 
policy reflective of CITES’ aim to not allow trade to jeopardize the 
survival of endangered species. 
 
190 See Prop 11, supra note 146, at 12. 
191 Convention on Intl. Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES], 
Summary record of the eleventh session of committee I, at 1, 2, CoP18 Com I. Rec. 11, 3 
(2019). 
192 Id. at 3. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
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While Zambia and Botswana’s proposals were symptoms of the 
underlying issues facing African elephants, Gabon’s proposal served as a 
sign of hope for the future of elephant conservation in CITES. China, the 
former lead global destination of illegal ivory, only second to Vietnam 
today, voted to move all African elephant populations to Appendix I. 
China’s vote along with their closure of domestic ivory markets should 
signal other countries that a refusal to transfer all African elephants to 
Appendix I will continue the poaching and illegal trade that pose the 
greatest short-term threat to their survival. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Proposals to modify CITES’ elephant policy will continue to be 
brought in various forms at each Conference of the Parties until the 
underlying issues they mask are addressed. CITES’ aim to not allow the 
trade in a species to threaten its survival will remain impossible without a 
total ban on the legal trade in ivory for time immemorial, and greater 
adoption of transboundary conservation into CITES organizational 
structure for elephants throughout Africa. Conceitedly, the vast 
complexity that accompanies an overhaul of CITES’ African elephant 
management cannot be outlined in a single article; however, the first step 
is to recognize the threats to the survival of African elephants and identify 
solutions. Parties that supported Gabon’s proposal may represent a 
brighter future for African elephants. CITES has the choice to proceed 
along its current route towards African elephant’s inevitable extinction; or 
adjust course towards a future where our grandchildren can still see 
elephants throughout Africa. The African elephant can be saved if their 
short- and long-term threats are properly addressed. While the forests of 
Knysna may never again play host to trumpets of days past, their kin across 
the continent can still be afforded the opportunity in the future. 
